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CASE NOTES
gested in this note, however, Santor is inapposite because the plaintiff in the
instant case cannot properly be characterized as a consumer.
It is quite possible, then, that a good deal of the difficulty on the
question of damages can be attributed to the equation of the terms "eco-
nomic" and "commercial." While consumers do have "economic losses," they
cannot, by definition, suffer "commercial losses." This terminology would
preserve the fundamental effect of Greenman which recognized that ". . . the
liability is not one governed by the law of contract warranties but by the
law of strict liability in tort."3° (Emphasis added.)
Under traditional tort theory, the "harm" is an independent step be-
tween the causative force (here the defect) and the ultimate "economic loss."
Ordinarily, then, the diminished utility of a defective product would not be
classified as this kind of tortious harm. Under the approach suggested here,
however, it is enough that the "economic loss" results directly from the
presence of the defect. This kind of result might appear to many to be un-
desirable or perhaps unjustifiable. It is submitted, however, that a con-
sistent and orderly application of the rationale of Greenman can yield no
other. An aversion to this result might well be grounds to resist any adoption
of the strict liability doctrine. It should not, however, be grounds to apply
the doctrine according to an evaluation of the needs of various plaintiffs. The
meaning of "defect" and of "consumer" can certainly be drawn narrowly,
but they ought not to be drawn artificially. If, then, the definition of "de-
fective" is restricted to goods which are truly unmerchantable and if the
term "consumer" is defined according to the nature of the transaction and
not according to a judicial appraisal of "bargaining power," the Greenman
rule can safely be given its natural effect. One who buys goods for commer-
cial use or resale must look solely to the rules of warranty for his remedy
if the goods are defective. On the other hand, one who buys for personal use
will not be restricted to a warranty action but he will be entitled to pursue
the non-commercial remedy of strict tort liability for all the damages caused
by a defect. The effect of the approach suggested here is simply to give to
the consumer an alternative remedy on the ground that he is often prejudiced
by the technical rules of warranty. The warranty rules which are necessary
for the orderly conduct of commercial affairs will thus not leave the "non-
commercial" plaintiff entirely without a remedy.
GERALD F. PETRUCCELLI, JR.
Trade Regulation—Section 5 of Federal Trade Commission Act—"Free"
Articles.—FTC v. Mary Carter Paint Co. 1—Mary Carter manufactures
and sells paint. For ten years it advertised, as its permanent policy, that for
every can of paint purchased, it would give the buyer a "free" can of equal
quality and quantity. Prior to this advertisement, however, it had never sold
30
 Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., supra note 11, at 63, 27 Cal. Rptr. at
701, 377 P.2d at 901.
1
 382 U.S. 46 (1965).
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single cans of paint. The Federal Trade Commission 'brought an action 2
against Mary Carter for violation of Section 5 of the FTC Act.° Adopting the
trial examiner's finding that
the usual and customary retail price of each can of Mary Carter
paint was not, and is not now, the price designated in the advertise-
ment but was, and is now, substantially less than such price. The
second can of paint was not, and is not now, "free," that is, was not,
and is not now, given as a gift or gratuity. The offer is, on the con-
trary, an offer of two cans of paint for the price advertised as or
purporting to be the list price or customary and usual price of one
can[,] 4
the Commission issued a cease and desist order .° Commissioner Elman dis-
sented° on the grounds that the order was contrary to the Commission's
policy, as promulgated in Walter J. Black, Inc."' and reaffirmed in Book of
the Month Club, Inc.,8 and that the Commission had not explained what was
deceptive in Mary Carter's practice. Elman was also disturbed that, in not
overruling Black, the FTC introduced confusion into an area which had well-
settled rules; as a result, advertisers would now be uncertain whether their
use of the word "free" is deceptive. Adapting Elman's dissent, the court of
appeals reversed the FTC's order as not in accord with the law.°
In its brief to the Supreme Court the FTC finally specified where the
deception lay." The Commission's contention, as summarized by Mary
Carter's counsel, was "that Mary Carter advertising created the 'misappre-
hension' in the minds of the buyers that the 'free' offer was for a limited time
only and that they should 'buy for fear that the offer will lapse if they de-
lay.' "" Mr. Justice Harlan dissenting, 12 the Supreme Court reversed the
court of appeals and HELD: The Commission's determination is neither
arbitrary nor clearly wrong."
The Black decision set down the Commission's policy as to the use of
the word "free."" There Walter J. Black, Inc., advertised that it would give
2
 Mary Carter Paint Co., 60 F.T.C. 1827 (1962).
3 38 Stat. 719 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. 45(a) (1) (1964): "Unfair methods
of competition in commerce, and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in commerce, are
declared unlawful."
4 Mary Carter Paint Co., supra note 2, at 1844.
5 Id. at 1866.
• Id. at 1853-66.
7 50 F.T.C. 225 (1953).
s 50 F.T.C. 778 (1954).
• Mary Carter Paint Co. v. FTC, 333 F.2d 654 (5th Cir. 1964).
10 Brief for FTC, p. 10, supra note 1.
11
 Brief for Respondent, p. 16, supra note 1. (Emphasis added.)
12 Supra note 1, at 49-53. Mr. Justice Harlan was disturbed that the Commission
did not demonstrate real deception and public injury. Acknowledging the Commission's
position that consumers might believe the offer to be temporary when in fact it was a
permanent policy, he stated that Mary Carter had always tried to associate with pur-
chasers that their offer was permanent; therefore, there was no deception.
18 Id. at 49. As authority for this great deference to the FTC's expertise, see FTC v.
Colgate-Palmolive Co., 380 U.S. 374 (1965).
14
 Walter J. Black, Inc., supra note 7, at 235-36. In its Administrative Interpreta-
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a free book to enrollees in its Classics or Detective Book Clubs. In both cases,
the same free book was continually offered, although subsequent books pur-
chased were always different. From this decision came the so-called Black
rule: The use of the word "free" is not an unfair or deceptive practive under
the FTC Act so long as (1) all additional requirements to receipt and reten-
tion of the free article are clearly stated at the outset so that the terms of
the advertisement will not be misunderstood; and (2) with respect to the
article to be purchased in order to receive the free item, the offeror does not
increase the ordinary and usual price or reduce the quality, quantity, or size
of the article. 15
The FTC ruled that Mary Carter could not rely on Black to avoid the
charge of deception for two reasons. First, unlike Walter J. Black, Mary
Carter had never established a market price for a single item of its product.
Second, even if Mary Carter had established a market price for one can of
its paint and then had changed to its present permanent policy, it perm'a-
nently offered the same free item and the same selling item at the same price.
In Black . . . while the policy of offering "free" books was a con-
tinuing one, the merchandise required to be purchased in order to
obtain a "free" article was not always the same merchandise. In
other words, the respondents . .. made a series of offers involving
entirely different books at varying prices, not a continuing offer
of a combination of the same two articles. . . . 16
The second of these distinctions is most important; the first is based
on a technical requirement with which Mary Carter could have easily com-
plied. It is noteworthy, however, that the second distinction was never eval-
uated in light of what was ultimately alleged as deceptive. At the commission
and the court of appeals levels, the FTC's approach was mainly negative: it
emphasized the importance of Black in determining deception and found that
Mary Carter did not meet the conditions prescribed by Black; therefore,
Mary Carter's practice was violative of section 5. Possibly because of the
adverse decision in the court of appeals, the Commission broadened its argu-
tions, 44 F.T.C. 1427 (1944), the Commission announced that the word "free" could not
be used when in fact the receipt and retention of the item were conditioned upon pur-
chase of another, even though the terms of the offer were clearly stated. See Book of the
Month Club, 48 F.T.C. 1297 (1948). The Black decision, supra note 7, permitted what
the Administrative Interpretations prohibited so long as certain rules were followed. See
Puro Co., 50 F.T.C. 454 (1953). These rules were reaffirmed in Book of the Month Club,
supra note 8. See Ray S. Kalwajtys, 52 F.T.C. 721, enforced, 237 F.2d 654 (1956). The
Black rules were made part of the Federal Regulations. Guides Against Deceptive Pricing,
Guide V, 23 Fed. Reg. 7966 (1958). With specific reference to two-for-the-price-of-one
offers, the guides required that the price for the two be "the advertiser's usual and
customary retail price for the single article in the recent, regular course of the business"
or, where the advertiser had not previously sold the article, the "usual and customary"
price for one in the area. Ibid. This guide was superseded on January 8, 1964, by Guides
Against Deceptive Pricing, Guide VI, 29 Fed. Reg. 180 (1964). Although this guide was
essentially a restatement of Black and the 1958 guide, the specific reference to two-for-
the-price-of-one offers was conspicuously absent.
15 Walter J. Black, Inc., supra note 7, at 235-36.
16
 Mary . Carter Paint Co., supra note 2, at 1851.
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ment before the Supreme Court to include an affirmative presentation of the
deception involved. The Court, however, merely said that the Commission's
determination that the practice was deceptive was neither arbitrary nor
clearly wrong.
When the second distinction is examined in light of the deception finally
alleged, serious question arises as to whether the distinction is material and
whether, as a practical matter, the practice in Black can stand under the
Mary Carter result. As previously indicated, the deception in Mary Carter's
practice goes to the time of the offer's availability: the import of the offer
is that it is for a limited time when, in fact, the offer is permanent. This ref-
erence to the time of the offer's availability, however, has two possible inter-
pretations. On the one hand, the Commission might be referring to the time
of availability of the basic article and the free article as a unit. If this inter-
pretation is correct, Mary Carter does not invalidate the practice in Black
because in that case the basic product was continually changing. This resulted
in a series of different free offers. On the other hand, if the Commission was
referring to the time of the free article's availability regardless of the basic
product involved, then Mary Carter invalidates the practice in Black because
the free article in both cases was always the same."
Whichever interpretation is correct, it is obvious that an addition will
have to be engrafted onto the Black rules if they are to continue as valuable
guides in the use of the word "free." Generally speaking, this addition is that
the offer must be for a limited time only. Henceforth, an advertiser who uses
the word "free" in a particular offer will not be permitted to use the word
indefinitely. What the present decision does not resolve is how long an offer
can be characterized as free before a violation of section 5 arises—a question
of considerable importance to many advertisers. The FTC ruled that ten
years was too long; however, there was no indication as to what time limits
it will set in the future.
SAMUEL L. BLACK
17
 Compare Commissioner Elrnan's dissent, id. at 1853-66, and the opinion of the
court of appeals, Mary Carter Paint Co. v. FTC, supra note 9, where it was flatly
stated that "the cases are.'indistinguishable." Id. at 657.
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